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ABSTRACT 
Many different legal and non-legal institutions govern and 
therefore shape knowledge production. It is tempting, given the 
various types of knowledge, knowledge producers, and systems 
with and within which knowledge and knowledge producers and 
users interact, to look for reductionist shortcuts-in general, but 
especially in the context of comparative institutional analysis. The 
temptation should be resisted for it leads to either what Harold 
Demsetz called the Nirvana Fallacy or what Elinor Ostrom 
critiqued as myopic allegories. 
One easy reductionist step is to focus on a particular 
dilemma-a particular market failure, for example, ignoring or 
assuming away others-and then compare institutions in terms of 
effectiveness in resolving the dilemma. We might, for example, 
want to use comparative institutional analysis to examine the 
problem of pharmaceutical development. If we focus on 
overcoming the potential undersupply of drugs (because they are 
expensive to develop but cheap to copy), and ifwe identify the FDA 
approval process (and specifically clinical trials) as the most 
important cost driver, then we might compare as potential 
responses patents and other institutions like prizes, grants, and 
government provided infrastructure for clinical trials. We might 
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then conclude that government funding of clinical trials is best 
because it lowers the cost of bringing drugs to market and without 
the deadweight loss associated with patents. That analysis might 
be useful, as far as it goes, but it would ignore other market 
failures, such as the demand-side failure that leads to 
underprovisioning of drugs to smaller or nonexistent markets. 
This is, of course, not to say that there is anything wrong with 
comparing institutions as solutions to the clinical-trial cost 
problem. But it is to emphasize that we can only design 
institutions to address problems we recognize, and the risk of 
myopia is strong in comparative institutional analysis. Engaging 
in meaningful comparison seems to demand a reduction in the 
scope of problems to which the institutions might be addressed, 
lest the problem seem intractable. 
We suggest that comparative institutional analysis must be 
accompanied by comparative failure analysis, by which we mean 
rigorous and contextual comparative analysis of the ways different 
institutional responses fail. And we argue that several different 
types of failures are relevant to comparative analysis. Some 
failures originate at the system level-that is, market systems 
exhibit certain sets of failures, while political/government and 
community systems exhibit other sets. In terms of figuring out 
what society wants (i.e., from the demand side), the systems rely 
on different signals, information, processes, and so on. And in 
terms of satisfying societal demand, the systems rely on different 
actors, distribution methods, and relationships. Other types of 
failures are system independent-they are a function of the 
resources at issue or the nature of the problem to which the 
institution is addressed. Institutional design can, of course, 
exacerbate or ameliorate these failures, but it is useful to 
understand their fundamental causes. 
So as a starting place, we think comparative analysis should 
account for characteristics that vary at the system level and shape 
both failures and institutions--characteristics like demand 
signaling processes, time horizons/discount rates, evaluative 
criteria (for projects, investments, or innovation), and the basic 
capabilities operative within different settings or systems. 
Failures and institutions obviously don't correspond exactly, and 
we suspect that comparative analysis of these and other 
characteristics will provide guidance for continued comparative 
analysis. We strongly believe that solid comparative analysis will 
require both theoretical and empirical work, operating in tandem 
rather than in isolation from each other. Comparative analysis is 
necessarily contextual. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
315 
Scholars engaged in comparative institutional analysis are 
poised to make significant contributions in the field of intellectual 
property, or more broadly, in information law and policy. 
Empirical work continues to show significant variance in the need 
for, and effect of, intellectual property and other innovation-
related laws and institutions-across industries, types of actors, 
and contexts. 1 The best work going forward will necessarily 
1. See generally JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How 
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008) (arguing that 
current patent law and institutions discourage innovation and investment); DAN L. BURK 
& MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND How THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009) 
(arguing that patent law is in crisis and proposing that courts solve the crisis by tailoring 
patent law to suit the needs of different industries); Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not 
Fit All: A Framework for Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361 
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involve interdisciplinary collaboration, mixed methods, and 
humility-the latter precisely because grand theories are unlikely 
to be sufficiently context-sensitive. 
We are already seeing this work blossom. Scholars have 
performed comparative institutional analysis with respect to a 
variety of innovation problems. One line of research has compared 
different types of institutions for incentivizing innovation, 
considering the respective benefits and drawbacks of patents, 
prizes,2 tax incentives,3 and grants.4 Several scholars have 
considered the roles of various types of intellectual property as 
complements or alternatives to other appropriation mechanisms 
like lead time, secrecy, and contract.5 There is a cottage industry 
of research studying the so-called negative spaces--contexts and 
communities within which norms govern creative and innovative 
behavior more strongly than do formal IP rules. 6 
A different line of work deals with the comparative 
advantages or disadvantages of certain institutions within the 
existing intellectual property framework-asking whether courts, 
Congress, or some government agency should make certain kinds 
of decisions or certain modifications to existing law; 7 what roles 
state and local regulations or institutions can play in innovation 
(2009) (examining and critiquing the United States's uniform approach to patent and 
copyright law). 
2. See Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 V AND. L. REV. 115, 172, 
175, 179 (2003); Michael J. Burstein & Fiona E. Murray, Innovation Prizes in Practice and 
Theory, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401, 449-51 (2016); Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual Property 
Versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 999, 1025, 1034 (2014). 
3. See Brett Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions: Rethinking the Economics of 
U.S. Science and Technology Policy, 24 VT. L. REV. 347, 382-85 (2000); Daniel J. Hemel & 
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEx. L. REV. 303, 311, 323-
26 (2013); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Government Choices in Innovation Funding (with Reference 
to Climate Change), 62 EMORYL.J. 1087, 1101, 1119-20 (2013). 
4. See W. Nicholson Price II, Grants, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 10 (2019). 
5. See id. at 12; Jonathan M. Barnett, Private Protection of Patentable Goods, 25 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1251, 1257, 1267 (2004); Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information 
Without Intellectual Property, 91 TEX. L. REV. 227, 262 (2012); Robert P. Merges, 
Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights 
Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1303 (1996). 
6. See David Fagundes, Talk Derby to Me: Intellectual Property Norms Governing 
Roller Derby Pseudonyms, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1093, 1115 (2012); David Fagundes & Aaron 
Perzanowski, Clown Eggs, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1313, 1327 (2019); Aaron Perzanowski, 
Tattoos & IP Norms, 98 MINN. L. REV. 511, 550 (2013); Zahr K. Said, Craft Beer and The 
Rising Tide Effect: An Empirical Study of Sharing and Collaboration Among Seattle's Craft 
Breweries, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 355, 395-97 (2019). 
7. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Administrative Power in the Era of 
Patent Stare Decisis, 65 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1566----68 (2016); Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. 
Rai, Who's Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 
95 GEO. L.J. 269, 309-12 (2007); Sapna Kumar, Patent Court Speci,alization, 104 IOWA L. 
REV. 2511, 2519-26 (2019); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional 
Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1065-74 (2003). 
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policy;8 whether certain tasks traditionally performed by 
government agencies should be privatized;9 what should be the 
roles of different government agencies in drug development or 
other health care policy;10 and whether certain questions of patent 
validity should be adjudicated in administrative challenges before 
the Patent Trial & Appeal Board or as part of patent infringement 
litigation in federal district court. 11 Yet other work compares the 
various institutions of intellectual property law to each other-
evaluating the role of patent, copyright, and trademark laws in 
achieving certain ends.12 
As this partial catalog demonstrates, one reason it is hard to 
describe comparative institutional analysis with much specificity 
is the openness of the concept of an "institution." These studies 
variously refer to government and market actors, legal rights and 
private ordering mechanisms, and even particular legal regimes 
as relevant "institutions." All of these fit within the broad 
definition of "institution" typically used by institutional 
economics, which includes any structure or mechanism that 
governs the behavior of a set of individuals. 13 This doesn't make 
8. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Arti K. Rai, Harnessing and Sharing the Benefits of 
State-Sponsored Research: Intellectual Property Rights and Data Sharing in California's 
Stem Cell Initiative, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1187, 1196, 1198 (2006); Camilla A. Hrdy, 
Patent Nationally, Innovate Locally, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1301, 1334 (2016); Camilla A 
Hrdy, State Patents as a Solution to Underinvestment in Innovation, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 
487, 498-505 (2013). 
9. See Irina D. Manta, Privatizing Trademarks, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 381, 392-95 (2009). 
10. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 350-56 (2007); W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-
Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 421, 451 (2017); Rachel E. Sachs, Prizing Insurance: 
Prescription Drug Insurance as Innovation Incentive, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 153, 171-72 
(2016). 
11. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit a Run for Its 
Money: Challenging Patents in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235, 240 (2015); Saurabh 
Vishnubhakat et al., Strategic Decision Making in Dual PTAB and District Court 
Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 51-55 (2016). 
12. See generally, e.g., Christopher Buccafusco et al., Intelligent Design, 68 DUKE L.J. 
75 (2018) (arguing that the segmented IP doctrines (design patents, utility patents, 
copyrights, etc.) result in costly screens that frustrate the creative purpose of IP); Colleen 
V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 Hous. L. REV. 325, 354-57 (2012) (noting a 
disconnect between traditional patents and software patents and recommending reforms 
within the software industry); Mark P. McKenna, (Dys)functionality, 48 Hous. L. REV. 823 
(2012) (critiquing the inconsistencies of the so-called functionality doctrine within 
trademark law); Viva R. Moffat, The Copyright/Patent Boundary, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 611 
(2013) (isolating the differences in copyright and patent law); Gideon Parchomovsky & 
Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 
1455 (2002) (advocating for the integration of traditionally separate IP segments); Pamela 
Samuelson, Strategies for Discerning the Boundaries of Copyright and Patent Protections, 
92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1493 (2017) (identifying the costs that accompany imprecise 
separation of copyright and patent law). 
13. See DOUGLAS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 3-10 (1990). 
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the concept of institutions meaningless, but it does mean that the 
field of study is a much larger one than intellectual property 
scholars often appreciate. 
In this Article we identify and seek to remedy two 
shortcomings of the existing body of research. 14 First, we criticize 
ambiguity in normative baselines, by which we mean the 
objectives, values or ends ultimately driving evaluation. Second, 
we criticize myopia in the analysis of social dilemmas, and 
particularly an inappropriately narrow focus on market failures. 
While we aim our criticisms constructively at comparative 
institutional analysis in IP, both apply more generally. 
Persistent ambiguity about the proper normative baseline 
infects IP scholarship. 15 Comparative institutional analyses often 
presume some objective and evaluate different institutions in 
terms of their ability to accomplish that objective. Sometimes, 
analysts explicitly identify the objective (for example, increased 
economic growth); other times, the objective is implied (for 
example, the analyst describes outcomes as ''better" or "worse," 
presumably in terms of social welfare). But however clearly (or 
not) the objectives are identified, in many cases they are not 
defended, at least not as against other possible objectives. 
More generally, the various comparative institutional 
analyses lack a common objective, or at least an objective 
described at a common level of generality. This makes it difficult-
perhaps impossible-to aggregate comparative institutional 
analyses or to compare them to each other. Given the range of 
different possible normative justifications for different innovation 
regimes, it may not be possible for comparative institutional 
analysis to solve this problem. We can, however, ask at least for 
greater transparency about the underlying normative premises. 
We offer a tentative suggestion to address this issue. 
Specifically, we propose that scenario analysis can help bridge the 
range of normative premises. Under this approach, the analyst 
14. A third shortcoming that we do not seek to address in this Article is the lack of a 
shared methodology or framework for comparative analysis in this context. Simply put, it 
is incredibly difficult to put the various studies together and learn from them. Yet surely 
that must be an important goal for the community of scholars doing the comparative work. 
One of us is currently involved with the development and use of a framework for 
institutional analysis for studying knowledge commons. Brett M. Frischmann et al., 
Governing Knowledge Commons, in GOVERNING KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 1, 10---11 
(Frischmann et al. eds., 2014); Katherine J. Strandburg et al., Knowledge Commons and 
the Road to Medical Commons, in GOVERNING MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 1 
(Katherine J. Strandburg et al. eds., 2016). There are close affinities between that project 
and this one, but we do not pursue them here. 
15. It is possible that there is no ambiguity and that normative baselines are simply 
embedded, but undefended, and perhaps ultimately simply assumed. 
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would consider a range of normative premises and evaluate 
institutional structures in light of those premises. Particular 
institutional arrangements might appear to be optimal across a 
variety of different premises such that second-order agreement 
might be possible.16 Scenario analysis also might illuminate the 
relationship between normative premises and institutional 
arrangements by highlighting the ways different normative 
premises lead to preferences for different institutional 
arrangements. 
The bulk of this Article is devoted to our argument for a more 
inclusive approach that involves comparative analysis of failures 
and institutions in context. We particularly emphasize the role of 
comparative failure analysis in this process. We differentiate 
failures that are a function of a particular institutional 
arrangement (which we call system-dependent failures) and 
failures that transcend those arrangements and affect a variety of 
different types of institutions (system-independent failures). 
We conclude with some brief applications of our ideas. 
Specifically, we sketch some potential studies relating to short-
sightedness and the concept of "progress," and we highlight a few 
examples of existing work that we think serve as exemplars of 
what we are advocating. 
II. NORMATIVE BASELINES FIRST 
Comparative institutional analysis requires careful attention 
to the basis for comparison. What all of the types of studies we 
have mentioned have in common is that they attempt to compare 
institutions in their effectiveness in achieving some end.17 That 
end, however, is often either taken for granted, left unspecified, or 
could be identified and described at such different levels of 
generality that the end might as well be unspecified. Take, for 
example, "Progress of Science and useful Arts," the constitutional 
basis for patent and copyright law in the United States. 18 What 
counts as progress in this sense? 
16. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 
1733, 1741-43 (1995). 
17. We thus are focused on comparative institutional analysis that purports to 
evaluate rather than just describe. We thank David Fagundes for reminding us that 
comparative analysis can be purely descriptive without judgment or normative evaluation. 
We are not focused on that category, however. See generally Frischmann et al., supra note 
14 (developing and applying a descriptive framework for systematic study of knowledge 
commons). 
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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Much of the IP literature assumes that the constitutional 
mandate should be understood in utilitarian terms, commanding 
maximization of utility (or, sometimes, welfare). There are a 
number of problems with that assumption. Despite all that has 
been written about the Progress Clause, there is really no solid 
legal evidence that the clause commits us to any particular 
normative framework. 19 Utilitarianism is a plausible choice, but it 
is just that-a choice. Casting utilitarianism as constitutionally 
mandated has important consequences: it marginalizes 
alternative normative objectives and stunts both normative debate 
and comparative analysis of institutions across various objectives, 
which we describe below. At worst, it precludes deeper 
consideration of the range of objectives society might pursue 
through copyright and patent. But even short of preclusion, the 
utilitarian frame sets a strong default position, putting a heavy 
burden on proponents of alternative, equally reasonable, 
objectives. 
Even if we accept that the Progress Clause imposes a 
consequentialist frame, such that copyright and patent are 
conceived of as means and Progress in Science and the Useful Arts 
as the ends, we are left with precious little information or guidance 
about what Progress in Science and the Useful Arts actually 
entails. As one of us has previously argued, 
Within the legal community, where we debate the contours 
of the legal systems nominally designed to promote cultural 
and scientific Progress, we know too little about that which 
we seek to promote. We place too much emphasis on easily 
observable and measurable outputs-works and 
inventions-and figure the more the merrier. As Boyle noted, 
the romantic conception of the author/inventor is intimately 
connected with our narrow product-focused vision. But that 
is only one of many possible paths along which our culture 
may progress, by which our cultural environment may 
evolve. There are others. We might, for example, imagine 
Progress as measured by the degree of participation in 
creative and inventive activities; participation in such 
activities yields outputs, to be sure, but participation also 
educates, builds human capital, skills, and ultimately may 
unlock human potential.20 
"Progress of Science and useful Arts" is simply too abstract a 
concept to serve as a baseline for evaluation. Indeed, any of the 
19. We make this argument more extensively in Brett Frischmann & Mark P. 
McKenna, Intergenerational Progress, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 123. 
20. Brett M. Frischmann, Cultural Environmentalism and The Wealth of Networks, 
74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1083, 1095-96 (2007) (footnotes omitted). 
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following understandings of "Progress" are perfectly reasonable 
from an interpretive, historical, and normative standpoint: 
A. advancement of the relevant knowledge frontiers-
scientific, technological, aesthetic, cultural, etc.21 
B. advancement in the distribution of existing knowledge-
making more of what is known by some, known to all-
framed in terms of education, human capital, or 
otherwise22 
C. greater quantity of outputs-works and inventions (of 
some types) 
D. qualitatively better outputs-works and inventions, 
subject to ambiguity regarding the criteria for judging 
some outputs ''better" 
E. broader participation in creative and inventive 
activities-possibly framed in terms of education, human 
capital, and/or access to the means of production23 
F. increased social welfare, subject to ambiguity about the 
meaning of "welfare" 
G. economic growth 
H. sustainable development 
These objectives may seem only subtly different, but the variations 
can matter quite a bit in terms of institutional design. Different 
institutional configurations will better promote different 
configurations of objectives. For example, we strongly suspect that 
different institutional configurations would be necessary if we 
sought to optimize (i) production of works and inventions, (ii) 
distribution of knowledge, or (iii) participation in creative and 
inventive activities. Yet the Progress Clause gives absolutely no 
guidance about which particular objective or mix of objectives we 
ought to pursue, much less prioritize. It is tempting to ignore these 
21. See Barton Beebe, Bleistein, The Problem of Aesthetic Progress, and the Making 
of American Copyright Law, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 376-85 (2017). 
22. See, e.g., Malla Pollack, What Is Congress Supposed to Promote?: Defining 
"Progress" in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or Introducing 
the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754, 776-79 (2001). 
23. See, e.g., Stephanie Plamondon Bair & Laura G. Pedraza-Farina, Anti-Innovation 
Norms, 112 Nw. U. L. REV. 1069, 1082-83 (2018); Stephanie Plamondon Bair, Impoverished 
IP 13-14 (BYU Law Research Paper No. 19-15), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3365290 [https:// 
perma.cc/9FF8-8QYQ]; Colleen Chien, Inequality, Innovation, and Patents 20 (Santa Clara 
Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2018-03), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3157983 [htt 
ps://perma.cc/MCS3-7Z2U]. 
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complexities and simply assume that the Progress Clause refers to 
one or another of these objectives, or simply to brush the issue 
under the rug by hiding the ambiguity in a general claim that IP 
should promote "innovation"-as if "innovation" were one thing. In 
fact, claims that certain legal systems better "promote innovation" 
are quite common despite all the evidence that has accumulated 
about the differential effects of various policies across industries. 
As Frischmann argued in a different context: "Innovation rivals 
capitalism among modern American gods, and it is blasphemous 
to question progress or attempt to slow down innovation and 
consider which path society might choose."24 
We recognize the temptation to characterize the ends of 
intellectual property or innovation policy at this level of generality 
in order to make the analysis, but settling for tractability is hardly 
a defensible way to settle such a complex normative question. Nor 
do we think analysts can ignore differences in normative baseline 
on the ground that normative analysis is beyond the scope of 
institutional design or comparative institutional analysis. First, as 
we explain further below, the normative question must be 
addressed for comparative institutional analysis to be meaningful. 
One cannot evaluate institutions without some sense of what the 
institutions are supposed to accomplish. Second, while it is true 
that the choice between different objectives is not itself an 
institutional design question, the allocation of the decision about 
which objectives to pursu~ffectively, the "who decides" 
question-quite clearly is one of institutional design.25 
At the most basic level, the "who decides" question appears 
settled because, in the context of IP, Congress more or less decides 
the objective(s).26 In theory, this means that the political process 
should provide information about what the public needs, wants, or 
24. Brett Frischmann, Thoughts on Techno-Social Engineering of Humans and the 
Freedom to Be Off (or Free from Such Engineering), 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 535, 538 
n.9 (2016) (citing NEIL GAIMAN, AMERICAN GODS (10th ed. 2011)). 
25. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN 
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PuBLIC POLICY 42 (1994) [hereinafter KOMESAR, IMPERFECT 
ALTERNATIVES]; NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND 
DEMAND OF RIGHTS 31-32 (2001) [hereinafter KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS]. 
26. Under the Supreme Court's current jurisprudence, this seems correct. The Court 
will apply rational basis review to IP legislation and will not give substance to the Progress 
Clause. See Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 329 (2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 
217-22 (2003). Alternatively, courts might interpret the Clause to have some substantive 
meaning that guides and/or constrains Congress. Read on its own or in conjunction with 
the First Amendment or even other sources of normative commitment, the Progress Clause 
could support a range of objectives, as suggested in the text above. See supra notes 21-23 
and accompanying text. 
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demands.27 But there are plenty of circumstances in which courts, 
administrative agencies, and even private actors necessarily make 
judgments about objectives. This is especially true where Congress 
assigns certain decision-making tasks to those other parties and 
leaves those actors interpretive room. 28 
Legal scholars are well-suited to engage in descriptive 
analyses of legal frameworks and prescriptive analyses of 
institutional designs given existing legal frameworks and some 
external normative objective. A lawyer's expertise is, after all, 
institutional design. Lawyers generally do not supply the ends; 
they supply means to achieving the ends supplied by others, 
typically by crafting institutional solutions to overcome obstacles 
to achieving their clients' objectives. Lawyers' normativity makes 
the most sense when they are engaged in comparative 
institutional analysis and the normative evaluation is really a 
comparison of means. That is, when a lawyer says A is preferable 
to B, they are making a normative statement. But that normative 
statement only makes sense (as a product of legal analysis, 
reasoning, or expertise) when the lawyer is comparing A and Bas 
means to achieving some particular objective, and the objective is 
not itself up for grabs, ambiguous, or selected by the lawyer.29 
One way of dealing with the intractability of the normative 
baseline problem is to engage in a variety of analyses that 
expressly assume a particular objective and evaluate the 
institutional arrangements best suited to achieving those 
objectives. Rather than simply determining how different 
27. We raise at least two very difficult questions about societal needs/wants/ 
preferences/values: 
First, how do we know what we want? Second, how do we learn to want whatever 
it is that we want? Answering these questions requires considerable analysis of 
the dynamic interplay between how we figure out what we want, how we manifest 
our demands, who gets to do the valuing (or ranking of values), and how the 
environment within which we are situated and the opportunities it affords 
simultaneously enable □, constrain□, and shape □ our wants/values. 
Frischmann, supra note 20, at 1095. 
28. In the landmark decision Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 
837, 842-45 (1984), the Supreme Court held that, where Congress has either delegated 
interpretive authority to an executive agency or failed to give explicit direction on the legal 
interpretation of a statute administered by the relevant agency, the Court will defer to the 
agency's reasonable interpretation of the organic statute. For an instance of an agency 
action that interprets a nominative directive from the government, here, the President, see 
Sherley v. Sebelius, 689 F.3d 776, 785 (D.C. Cir. 2012). We leave aside for now a discussion 
of how the systems in which these actors operate generate the information needed to make 
these determinations of objectives and the various ways in which system failures might 
distort the articulation of public needs/wants/demands. 
29. Indeed, absent comparative analysis, it is hard even to evaluate normative 
claims. Not surprisingly, the basic "compared to what" question is a tried-and-true favorite 
at faculty workshops. 
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copyright regimes fare as means for promoting one or another of 
the objectives we identified above, for example, we might do 
better---collectively, as researchers-by conducting a 
comprehensive series of comparative analyses of the regimes best 
suited to promote different objectives. This might take the form of 
scenario analyses where scenarios are defined according to 
different objectives.30 
One can imagine, for example, one scenario (SJ) in which 
Congress decides the public needs/wants/demands institutions 
that meet objective A, scenario two (S2) in which Congress decides 
the public needs/wants/demands institutions to meet objective 
B, ... scenario n (Sn) in which Congress decides the public 
needs/wants/demands objective Xn. And we might consider 
scenarios in which the objective might be some function of A, B, ... 
Xn, where the various objectives are weighted. Thus, one scenario 
might involve an equal weighting across possible objectives or 
even complete uncertainty about what the public 
needs/wants/demands.31 It may turn out that particular 
institutional arrangements make sense across a range of 
objectives, and that might allow us to draw some conclusions 
without having to settle on any particular objective. Or it might 
allow us to determine that particular institutional arrangements 
make sense for a certain cluster of objectives, and that different 
arrangements make sense for another cluster. This approach 
would at least help illuminate the relationship between 
institutional structure and normative goal-to see which 
institutional design features are sensitive to normative goals and 
under what circumstances. 
There is, of course, a risk that this could quickly get messy 
and possibly intractable, depending on the range of scenarios 
analyzed. But we don't mean to suggest that every scenario must 
be analyzed in any one study. In fact, conceiving of this kind of 
scenario analysis as the broad framework for research should 
enable individual analysts to focus self-consciously on particular 
scenarios and frame the findings in relation to other similar 
scenario analyses. 
30. See, e.g., DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF LAW 210-11 (2012). 
There is a rich literature on the approach. In his book, The Economic Dynamics of Law, 
David Driesen argues for the use of scenario analysis in various contexts, with particular 
emphasis on environmental law where scenario analysis would supplement and/or replace 
cost-benefit analysis. 
31. This is obviously akin to specifying social welfare functions. We recognize the 
similarity, but do not commit to employing those techniques. For our purposes, it is enough 
to recognize the apparatus that could be used and perhaps must be used in some contexts. 
The comparative analysis itself is not dependent on these techniques. They are likely 
complementary. 
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Another related approach would be to group the studied 
scenarios at different levels of micro-meso-macro context and 
specificity. Consider the possibilities detailed in the Sections 
below. 
A. Micro, Small-Scale Contextual 
These studies would begin with a clear, well-understood 
context within which a specific objective is well-defined and 
politically-acceptable. There might be some useful negotiation 
over how to articulate the objective, but this process should take 
place ex ante. For example, we might consider the context of drug 
development and articulate the objective in terms of supplying 
drugs to the public that deliver demonstrably large health-related 
benefits (perhaps measured in terms of quality-adjusted life years 
(QALYs)). 32 We could also narrow the agreed-upon objective, 
perhaps to lowering the cost of delivering existing drugs with 
substantial health benefits. Or we could narrow it even further to 
focus on specific health problems. Thus, Brett might conduct a 
comparative analysis of institutions aimed at delivering drugs 
(health care improvements) to deal with malaria; Mark might do 
the same with respect to AIDS; Kelly with respect to obesity; and 
Maria with respect to autism. 
Whatever the level of specificity, it is important to first choose 
a defined, well-understood context within which we can identify a 
particular objective that is politically-acceptable and perhaps even 
politically-established. We can then engage in a comparative 
analysis of institutions within that context and make some 
headway in understanding how well different institutions serve 
the defined objective. If multiple objectives are unavoidable, then 
the scenario analysis suggested above might be necessary, but at 
least it would be more tractable in the more manageable micro-
context. 
There are, of course, limitations to this approach. Working at 
this level necessarily requires the analyst to bracket important 
questions: Why focus on this context rather than another? Why 
this objective? Why, to take our examples above, malaria rather 
than AIDS, obesity, or autism? 
Regardless, there are genuine advantages to these types of 
studies. For one thing, they can at least be done in an open, 
transparent fashion such that assumptions and choices can be 
interrogated. When they are done well, these studies can provide 
useful information that might be sufficiently close to the real world 
32. Sachs, supra note 10, at 186. 
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that it can be practically useful and perhaps even point to some 
politically feasible policy intervention. They might be particularly 
useful where it seems very likely that something in the relevant 
context will be done one way or another, such that the comparative 
analysis will be relevant. And, of course, if these kinds of studies 
are done as part of the kind of scenario analysis we described 
above, we might be able to aggregate the studies and draw some 
lessons at a higher level of generality. 
B. Meso, Sector-Specific Context, with Somewhat More Generic 
Articulation of the Objective 
This type of analysis would begin with a well-understood 
context that is defined in terms of a cognizable (industrial, 
economic, technological, cultural) sector within which the relevant 
set of intellectual activities, actors, relationships, and so on can be 
reasonably well-understood. The analyst would then attempt to 
articulate a well-defined and politically-acceptable objective for 
that sector. It is likely that such an objective will have to be stated 
at a rather high level of abstraction to accommodate the diversity 
of actors and beliefs about what "success" (progress) within that 
sector might entail. 33 In a sense, this is the sector's general 
purpose, and in at least some situations, that purpose might 
provide a satisfactory basis for evaluation. It might be necessary, 
once more, to look for more concrete objectives and employ 
scenario analyses. Or it might be useful to conduct a series of 
smaller-scale, micro comparative analyses within the sector. 
Of course, there are obstacles and limitations to sector-
specific comparative analysis. Some are the same as we discussed 
regarding micro-level analyses-for example, why this sector 
rather than another? Others concern line drawing and the 
definition or delineation of sectors themselves-this is done 
imperfectly already, however, and there would be no reason to 
reinvent the wheel. One analytical concern is the extent of 
spillovers across sectors, both in terms of the impact that 
institutions in one sector might have on others and in terms of the 
impact that R&D and other activities in one sector might have on 
others. Obviously, this can occur at the micro-level as well. 
Sector-specific comparative analysis at least reduces the 
scope of the analysis and the corresponding range of objectives, 
and it also may be useful for analytical reasons. Specifically, 
33. See JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND EVERYDAY 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 271 (2015). Relatedly, we think it would be interesting to study 
the beliefs of actors within the identified sector. What counts as success within the sector? 
What is progress? 
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comparative institutional analysis is likely to be more tractable 
and manageable within sectors. 
The pharmaceutical industry is a decent context for this type 
of comparative institutional analysis. In fact, recent surges in drug 
prices have driven scholars to evaluate how different institutional 
arrangements might bring prices down without undermining 
R&D, innovation, reliability, or other widely accepted industry 
objectives. Michael Carrier, among others, has analyzed how 
different combinations of patent, antitrust, and related regulation 
potentially would work.34 His testimony to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee on "Intellectual Property and the Price of Prescription 
Drugs: Balancing Innovation and Competition" is representative. 
Though contested (for obvious reasons), his essential claim, based 
upon his comparative analysis of past, present, and his proposed 
regimes, is that a series of legislative reforms would bring prices 
down (the primary objective in his analysis), curb industry abuse 
of existing laws that were intended to benefit consumers, all with 
little impact on innovation or R&D investment. In other words, he 
claims to have identified a configuration of institutions that 
constitute a (second-best) win-win across objectives that should 
receive bipartisan support.35 Other scholars, including Rachel 
Sachs, have made similar arguments about institutional 
arrangements for reducing drug costs and/or promoting wider 
access.36 
C. Macro, Not Constrained by Context or Sector, Framed at the 
Broad Level of National Political and Economic Systems, 
with a Generic Articulation of Objective(s) 
It is tempting to conduct comparative analysis at a macro-
level and thus offer prescriptions with the broadest impact. But, 
as is the case for meso-level analyses, for such work to be credible, 
there must be a basis for evaluation, a broad but well-defined and 
34. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Sharing, Samples, and Generics: An Antitrust 
Framework, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 44-4 7 (2017); Michael A. Carrier et al., Using Antitrust 
Law to Challenge Turing's Daraprim Price Increase, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1379, 1398--
1400 (2016); Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for 
Presumptive fllegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 69 (2009). 
35. Professor Carrier does not claim he has identified the optimal first best solution 
for promoting the set of social values implicated by the legal regimes he has analyzed. 
Rather, he claims that specific legislation "on samples, settlements, citizen petitions, 
product hopping, and patent thickets would make patients' lives better without affecting 
innovation." See Intellectual Property and the Price of Prescription Drugs: Balancing 
Innovation and Competition: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 
(2019) (statement of Michael A. Carrier, Professor, Rutgers Law School). 
36. See Sachs, supra note 10, at 176-77; Rachel E. Sachs, Delinking Reimbursement, 
102 MINN. L. REV. 2307, 2335-36 (2018). 
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politically-acceptable overall objective-one that is stated at a 
high enough level of abstraction to accommodate the diversity of 
actors and beliefs about what "success" (Progress) might entail. 
There are a few candidates, including objectives framed in terms 
of social welfare or economic growth. 
These candidates have serious flaws. Most simply, in our 
current historical and political context, these objectives can only 
be presumed or argued for and justified. There is no basis for 
concluding that the people (through the political process) manifest 
a commitment to academics' construction of objectives (or social 
welfare functions, etc.) framed in these terms. Indeed, our list of 
understandings of the constitutional concept of Progress indicates 
significant disagreement about objectives even among academics 
focused on intellectual property and innovation. That such 
disagreement persists suggests that the evidence for any 
particular understanding is quite ambiguous and subject to 
contrary evidence.37 And that is just among legal scholars. In our 
view, the way the political process manifests demand is simply too 
coarse and distorted to provide any meaningful support for a 
public commitment to economic growth or welfare maximization 
as objectives for IP policy. 
Still, in theory, comparative analysis under various scenarios 
at the macro-level would be useful. That is, for the reasons 
explained above, it would be informative at least to know how 
different institutional regimes fared in various scenarios, where 
the scenarios involve different objectives or weighting of 
objectives. It might be the case that certain institutional designs 
are preferable regardless of the scenario-or perhaps for a wider 
range of scenarios than others. For example, a comparative 
evaluation of different institutions (patent, prize, tax, and so on) 
or even different designs for a particular institution (patent) as 
means for pursuing different visions of Progress (economic growth, 
social welfare, and so on) would be incredibly useful. It would, of 
course, be wonderful to identify potential win-win opportunities 
where a configuration of institutions fared well. 
In The Wealth of Networks (2006), Yochai Benkler did 
something similar to what we have in mind. Benkler conducted 
comparative institutional analysis across a range of normative 
values. He carefully analyzed commons-based peer production as 
a provisioning system, in comparison with market-organized and 
firm-organized proprietary-based provisioning. These provisioning 
systems are, or at least can be understood as, macro-level means 
37. Frischmann & McKenna, supra note 19, at 128. 
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that involve complex institutional structures. Accordingly, it 
seems to us that Ben.Ider is engaged in comparative institutional 
analysis at the macro-level. 
In a sense, Benkler "supplies" the ends because he chooses 
liberal political theory as the baseline. Some such choice must be 
made. What we find most important is that he is explicit, wide-
ranging, and substantive in his engagement with the normative 
values. The normative values Benkler discusses include: 
autonomy (Chapter Five), democratic participation in both the 
political sphere (Chapter Seven) and the construction of culture 
(Chapter Eight), justice and human development (Chapter Nine), 
and community (Chapter Ten). 
The normative thrust of the book is that the emerging 
nonmarket production systems should be allowed, if not 
encouraged, to emerge within the core of the information 
economy rather than consigned to the periphery. The 
dynamic changes to the technological and economic 
conditions of the information environment enable nonmarket 
production to coexist and in some instances rival market 
production. Not surprisingly, dominant market players may 
resist the emergence of nonmarket production systems for a 
variety of reasons. Incumbents may see emergent systems as 
direct substitutes or as disruptive technologies that will 
enable new entrants to challenge the incumbents' market 
positions. In addition, incumbents may see emergent 
systems as "free-riders" that unfairly benefit from existing 
proprietary systems. Finally, incumbents may seek to 
control the development and emergence of these systems so 
as to ensure a "cut" of the eventual benefits. The critical 
prescriptive point ... is that society should avoid optimizing 
legal, technological, economic, and other socially constructed 
conditions-the institutional ecology-for the industrial or 
proprietary modes of production. 38 
Although Benkler might not have viewed himself as engaging 
in comparative institutional analysis, the normative section of his 
book reflects his approach to the macro-level institutional design 
choice about which provisioning systems to rely on and support. 
He did not argue in favor of one provisioning system to the 
exclusion of others; to the contrary, he argued for design choices 
that would preserve freedom for all rather than giving in to 
persistent pressures to optimize the institutional ecology. 39 And 
this final point highlights, as Komesar emphasized in his seminal 
38. Frischmann, supra note 20, at 1117-18. 
39. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 391-92 (2006). 
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work on comparative institutional analysis, that the "who decides" 
question is perhaps the most important and hotly contested 
institutional choice.40 
To conclude this Part, we think it is necessary to begin with 
the end(s) that serve as the underlying basis for comparative 
evaluation of failures and institutions in context. Without 
attention to the normative end(s), which we've described in terms 
of objectives, comparative analysis is limited to a descriptive 
comparison of the way various institutions function and the 
consequences of those institutional arrangements. 41 No 
comparative evaluation can be made because there is no basis for 
judgment. 
In our view, comparative institutional analysis loses 
something as it moves from the micro- to meso- to macro-level of 
analysis. Specifically, it loses relevance and connectedness to real-
world systems, and it dilutes empirical information about what 
actors need/want/demand. From a purely normative perspective--
focusing on the well-defined and politically-acceptable objective 
that serves as the basis for comparing institutions and failures-
the more micro the analysis, the more trustworthy it is. At the 
same time, the more micro the analysis, the more open the analyst 
is to being challenged on the limitations noted above: whether 
generalization is possible, and whether prescriptions for legal 
reform can be developed. 42 Those challenges, however, have more 
to do with the biases of legal scholarship, since the best approach 
may be to pursue a series of micro-level studies in order to develop 
the knowledge base for analysis at the meso- or macro-levels.43 
40. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 25, at 42; KOMESAR, LAW'S 
LIMITS, supra note 25, at 31-32. 
41. The Governing Knowledge Commons framework and collaborative research 
agenda is, at this stage, primarily descriptive. Its primary aim is to systematically study a 
wide range of knowledge commons, including various dilemmas, community objectives, and 
institutions. The individual case studies tend to be at the micro-level, and some series of 
case studies provide insight at the meso-level. See Frischmann et al., supra note 14, at 1-
2; Strandburg et al., supra note 14, at 9-10. 
42. This triggers the various concerns over uniformity costs, which scholars who have 
advocated some form of tailoring have dealt with at length. See generally Dan L. Burk & 
Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575 (2003) (discussing the 
failure of uniform technology patents and calling for tailoring of patent to specific 
industries); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1158 (2002) (noting that patent law is one area of many in 
which there are "drawbacks" to "encompassing many types of subject matter within one 
broad system"); Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in 
Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845 (2006) (discussing the problems of 
uniformity cost in patent law and copyright law and the adequacy of legal institutions to 
address them). 
43. Cf Rachel E. Sachs, Innovation Law and Policy: Preserving the Future of 
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Finally, as we explore in more detail below, the level of analysis 
might also affect the relevance of different (market, political, 
communal) system failures and institutions. There may be a 
question of fit. Failures and institutions may vary across levels, 
just as the objectives vary. 
Ill. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FAILURES AND INSTITUTIONS IN 
CONTEXT 
Comparative institutional analysis must consist m 
substantial part of comparative failure analysis, by which we 
mean rigorous and contextual comparative analysis of market, 
political/government, and community failures. In this Part, we 
first briefly explain why and then we explain how. The why section 
explains the ways in which distorting myopia creeps into analyses 
of institutions aimed at promoting innovation. The distortions 
dramatically limit what we can learn from the comparative 
studies. In the how section, we begin with a preliminary diagnosis 
of failures and, in particular, develop the distinction between 
system-independent and system-dependent failures. We then 
discuss the relationships between institutions and these various 
failures. 
A. The Importance of Comparative Failure Analysis 
Many different legal and non-legal institutions govern and 
therefore shape knowledge production. The variety of knowledge, 
knowledge producers, and systems with and within which 
knowledge and knowledge producers and users interact make it 
all too tempting to look for reductionist shortcuts. That is true in 
general, but it is especially tempting when one undertakes the 
task of comparative institutional analysis. The temptation should 
be resisted for it leads to either what Demsetz called the Nirvana 
Fallacy or what Ostrom critiqued as myopic allegories. 44 One easy 
reductionist step is to focus on a particular dilemma-identify a 
particular market failure, for example, ignoring or assuming away 
Personalized Medicine, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1881 (2016) (discussing the importance of 
diagnostic testing to individualized medicine and the interplay between patent law, FDA 
regulation, and health law to achieve broad results); Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 360, 363 
(same). 
44. See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GoVERNING THE COMMONS 13-15 (1990); Harold 
Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1969); Brett 
M. Frischmann, Two Enduring Lessons from Elinor Ostrom, 9 J. INST. ECON. 387 (2013); 
Elinor Ostrom, A Diagnostic Approach for Going Beyond Panaceas, 104 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. 
Ser. U.S. 15181 (2007). 
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others-and then compare institutions in terms of effective 
resolution of the dilemma. 
At the macro-level, for example, scholars tend to frame the 
problem to be solved by intellectual property laws as a basic public 
goods problem, which is often described in terms of the free-rider 
allegory.46 Simply put, because intellectual resources are public 
goods (nonrival and (non)excludable), 46 they may be undersupplied 
within markets. The inability to cheaply exclude competitors and 
nonpaying consumers (free-riders) presents a risk that investors 
perceive ex ante (prior to production of the good), and that may 
discourage optimal levels of investment in production of the good. 
Many analysts assume: (1) that the free-rider allegory 
describes a normal rather than exceptional problem; and (2) that 
underproduction can be solved only by government subsidy or 
intellectual property-enabled markets.47 Government subsidies 
deal with the underproduction problem directly rather than by 
constraining consumption. The government allocates funds to 
research activities that yield intellectual resources, making 
investment risks less important. The resulting intellectual 
resources can be shared openly and freely without concern, 
because the underproduction problem has been solved on the front 
end. By contrast, intellectual property rights lower the costs of 
exclusion, enable transactions, and mitigate the risk to investment 
posed by free-riders. Intellectual property rights thus enable 
markets to function more effectively in supplying intellectual 
resources. 
Unfortunately, both of the assumptions we identify at least 
oversimplify reality. First, free-riding may describe a normal or an 
exceptional problem-we simply do not know for sure. There is 
insufficient empirical evidence to support a general macro-level 
claim either way. Overall, the empirical evidence is quite mixed 
and suggests the answer varies considerably by context. The 
relevance of the free-riding risk is best evaluated empirically in 
45. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 
83 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2005) (explaining the traditional free-rider problem as manifested in 
the IP context). 
46. We use nonrivalry (without the parentheses) because this characteristic is 
inherent or fixed for intellectual resources, and we use (non)excludability because this 
characteristic is context-dependent, is variable with the costs of exclusion, and can be 
addressed through various institutional interventions. See BRETI M. FRISCHMANN, 
INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES 254 n.1 (2012). For a 
thorough discussion of public goods, see id. at 24-57, and for a thorough discussion of 
intellectual public goods, see id. at 253-314. 
4 7. See Frischmann, supra note 44, at 398; Brett M. Frischmann et al., Retrospectives: 
Tragedy of the Commons After 50 Years, 33 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES (forthcoming Fall 2019). 
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context. In some contexts, free-riding is not a problem to be solved 
at all; in fact, it may very well be beneficial for society.48 Second, 
in theory and practice, the solution set is considerably more 
diverse and nuanced than most analyses assume. Note how the 
binary thinking frames the macro-institutional choice (market vs. 
government) and leaves alternative provisions systems (e.g., 
commons) out of view.49 Moreover, while this framing leads to 
some convenient, compartmentalized divisions of labor between 
government and market, it (all too conveniently) ignores a host of 
complications internal to the market and government institutions, 
which we discuss below as system-dependent failures. The 
allegory blinds us to the various problems and solutions, and even 
when it doesn't, it too easily subordinates them.50 
The concern about myopia is not limited to the macro-level. 
At the mesa-level, we might, for example, want to use comparative 
institutional analysis to examine the pharmaceutical industry. If 
we focus on overcoming the potential undersupply of drugs-
because drugs are expensive to develop but cheap to copy-and we 
attribute the undersupply problem to the risk of potential free-
riders, we might choose one narrow set of institutions to compare. 
We might, for example, compare differently-designed patent 
regimes, prizes, and tax incentives. Our concern is not only with 
the free-rider problem, however. If we identify the FDA approval 
process (and specifically clinical trials) as the source of many of 
the costs associated with drug development, we might be inclined 
to compare a different set of institutions-for example, patents 
and other institutions like prizes, grants, and government-
provided infrastructure for clinical trials. 51 With regard to the 
48. See FRISCHMANN, supra note 46, at 261-62; Brett M. Frischmann, Spillovers 
Theory and Its Conceptual Boundaries, 51 WM. & MARYL. REV. 801, 807-13 (2009); Brett 
M. Frischmann & Mark A Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 258-60 (2007). 
49. See generally, e.g., BENKLER, supra note 39 (discussing the effect of such binary 
forces on the industrial information economy); Frischmann, supra note 44; Ostrom, supra 
note 44. 
50. There is much more we can say about the distortions associated with this framing. 
For example, it happens to work very well with the linear model of innovation-another 
terribly flawed model that is nonetheless widely adopted because of its tractability. See 
FRISCHMANN, supra note 46, at 271-74. 
51. This highlights another reason why a broader framework for comparative 
institutional analysis is important: most existing studies consider only a narrow range of 
alternatives. Sometimes the studies are constrained by existing alternatives. Other times 
the analysis is confined because it can only be tractable within defined limits, and 
particularly because alternatives are difficult to compare when there are few common 
dimensions along which to draw the comparisons. Hence, while we see comparisons of 
patents and prizes or tax incentives, we do not see (to our knowledge, at least) comparisons 
between intellectual property laws and investment in music and art education as means of 
producing greater or better creative output. We note this not to be critical, but to note that 
comparisons are only meaningful as between those things that are compared, and it is 
important to understand the limitations of any particular comparative analysis. 
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latter, we might then determine that government funding of 
clinical trials was best because it lowers the cost of bringing drugs 
to the market and lessens deadweight as compared to patents. 
That analysis might be useful, as far as it goes, but it would 
ignore still other problems, such as the demand-side failure that 
leads to under-provisioning of drugs to smaller or nonexistent 
markets. This is not to say that there is anything wrong with 
comparing institutions as solutions to the free-rider or clinical-
trial cost problem. But it is to emphasize that we can only design 
institutions to address problems we recognize, and the risk of 
myopia is strong in comparative institutional analysis because 
introducing multiple institutions to compare seems to demand of 
the analyst a corresponding reduction in the scope of problems to 
which the institutions might be addressed. 
B. Comparing Institutional Failures 
Recall that in the previous section, we suggested that one 
must start with a defined objective (end) and context (level of 
analysis). Here, we assume that this has been done. In other 
words, the relevant objectives (ends) are settled, even if only in 
functional terms or as part of a scenario, and we're ready to 
evaluate means. 52 
We might begin with the biggest institutional choice question: 
what provisioning system is the best means to that end? What are 
the options?-Markets? Governments? Communities? Comparing 
these systems requires recognition not just of the strengths of 
different institutions, but also of the ways those institutions fail. 
We use "fail" here capaciously-and particularly we mean it more 
broadly than the type of "market failure" at the center of the 
dominant framing of intellectual property. As we discussed above, 
intellectual property rights are often described as necessary to 
remedy a particular kind of market failure that arises because of 
the public goods nature of inventions and works of authorship. 53 
Specifically, inventions and works of authorship are costly to 
create but, owing to their non-rivalry and non-excludability, easy 
to copy and distribute at a price that would prevent the developer 
from recapturing its investment. We certainly don't mean to argue 
that this kind of market failure is irrelevant, only to highlight that 
this is only one type of failure that needs to be considered. 
52. We understand that there are problems with neatly separating means and ends. 
For now, we leave that aside. 
53. See supra text accompanying note 45; Lemley, supra note 45, at 1039-40. 
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As we discuss extensively below, some failures have to do with 
the nature of the institution under consideration. Certain failures, 
for example, will be common to government institutions; others 
will be common to market-based institutions. Some failures will 
relate to the nature of the task an institution will be expected to 
undertake and not to the type of institution. Administration of 
prizes, for example, depends on the administering entity's ability 
to gather information about the desired output and the structure 
and size of the prize necessary to induce that output. That is true 
regardless of the type of institution that administers the prize. 
Still other failures will result from the combination of the 
institution and the type of task. 
It therefore might be necessary, or at least helpful, to identify 
preliminarily the system-independent failures (or dilemmas) that 
will need to be overcome to achieve the stated objective. These 
might influence the macro-level options and evaluation. Then we 
can proceed to consider and compare the system-dependent failures 
and institutional options. 
1. System-Independent Failures. Some obstacles to 
achieving the stated objectives are a function of variables, 
characteristics, or circumstances that do not depend on the 
provisioning system. We call these system-independent failures. 
Usually these failures are a function of the natural resource 
environment or of human nature. 54 These obstacles might be seen 
as exogenous to any particular system, although as we will see 
that might go too far since the systems may mitigate or aggravate 
the obstacles in various ways. 55 Consider three examples: 
(non)rivalry as an example of a resource characteristic; 
shortsightedness as an example of a characteristic of human 
beings; and externalities that can be a combination of the two. 
The first example is the rivalrousness of physical resources 
and nonrivalrousness of ideas.56 These resource characteristics 
54. Bear in mind that market and political systems are social constructs. 
55. We identify these as system-independent failures, using "independence" in a 
much weaker sense than is often used in social science and mathematical contexts. In those 
contexts, independence implies that the systems do not affect the problems. But, as we 
recognize in the text, the systems may feed into or reinforce the problems, in ways large 
and small. 
56. We tend to emphasize failures associated with nonrivalrousness, but 
rivalrousness can be equally problematic. Whether the marginal cost of consuming 
something is zero or positive, different complications may arise for suppliers. In a sense, 
rivalrousness creates information problems-how much of a resource should be supplied? 
To determine provisioning, one needs to know who needs/wants/demands how much of 
what. Governments may struggle, and markets may thrive, in overcoming this problem by 
use of the price mechanism, but reliance on markets for rivalrous goods creates demand for 
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give rise to obstacles (even governance dilemmas)57 that exist 
regardless of which systems society chooses to rely on as means for 
provisioning or governing the resources. Of course, the obstacles 
may vary in magnitude or form across systems, and again, the 
systems can be designed to exacerbate or lessen the dilemmas. But 
the point is that the resource characteristics that give rise to 
obstacles or dilemmas are not a function of provisioning systems. 
Shortsightedness afflicts human beings, and it can be 
exacerbated, controlled, or adjusted within any of the systems. 58 
Political systems may be designed to extend or shorten time 
horizons; the same is true of markets, of course. But the problem 
of shortsightedness originates with individual human beings and 
characteristics of human behavior and decision-making. We use 
shortsightedness to refer to decision-making that irrationally 
preferences the short-run over the long-run, or put another way, 
decision-making that irrationally discounts the future. 59 One 
could engage in shortsighted decision-making either by favoring 
short-run gains over significantly larger long-run gains, by 
choosing policies that generate short-run gains but larger long-
term costs, or by avoiding short-run costs when the consequence is 
more significant longer-term costs. A variety of psychological 
biases contribute to the problem.60 Shortsightedness constitutes a 
system-independent problem because of its origins in human 
behavior and because it distorts individual and collective decision-
making regardless of the provisioning system. 61 
a certain type of governance institution--exclusive rights to possession and use-without 
which markets may struggle. Nonrivalrousness doesn't eliminate the information 
problem-we still need to know what to supply and to whom, but it is different in certain 
respects. This is not the place to fully describe the obstacles. Frischmann has discussed 
them extensively elsewhere. See generally FRISCHMANN, supra note 46; Frischmann et al., 
supra note 14. 
57. Another way to frame this would be to say that the resource characteristics 
themselves give rise to societal demand for governance. 
58. For a short piece on shortsightedness that begins with an episode of South Park, 
see Brett M. Frischmann, Some Thoughts on Shortsightedness and Intergenerational 
Equity, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 457, 457-60 (2005). 
59. We could discuss a host of behavioral economic concerns here. See generally DAN 
ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL (First Harper Perennial 2010) (2008). 
60. Shortsightedness is one of the examples/applications we will explore. See infra 
Section IV.A. 
61. Here, again, we run into some confusion about our use of independence. Different 
provisioning systems can mitigate or exacerbate shortsightedness, and thus actual or 
observed shortsightedness is not independent of systems in the technical sense used in 
mathematics or the social sciences. See supra note 55. A similar point arose in the old debate 
about causation in which Ronald Coase observed that externalities arise from 
interdependence and are thus jointly produced. See Brett M. Frischmann & Alain Marciano, 
Understanding the Problem of Social Cost, 11 J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 329, 332-41 (2014). 
See generally R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1961). 
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A third example is externalities. Although often described as 
a type of market failure, this is a mistake. Externalities are 
system-independent, at least at a rather fundamental level where 
we examine what causes external effects to be external or outside 
of people's accounting or view or decision-making process. 
Externalities are, by definition, third-party effects; they exist 
when one person acts in a fashion (or even when two people jointly 
act in an interdependent manner) that leads to costs or benefits 
that are not factored into the actor's decision-making process.62 In 
the context of markets, the idea is that an individual's willingness 
to pay doesn't account for the external benefits or costs realized by 
others. But of course, there is nothing inherent about externalities 
that makes them more susceptible to full accounting 
(internalization) within political systems. To the contrary, people 
cast votes and otherwise exercise political power in various ways 
that cause--or fail to account for-external effects. It may be the 
case the markets and political systems fail differently or more 
(less) frequently with respect to different types of externalities, or 
perhaps that institutions within those systems are better suited to 
dealing with externalities. And externality problems may be made 
worse within different systems-e.g., relying on markets to guide 
environmental resource allocation may systematically fail because 
of externalities. But our basic point holds. Externalities are not 
dependent on the provisioning system; rather, they are a product 
of interdependence among people and resources. 
Another resource-related, system-independent failure is what 
Frischmann referred to as "innovative process market failure."63 
Though he erroneously framed the problem in terms of market 
failure, the problem he identified was not dependent on the choice 
of the market as the provisioning system. Rather, that problem 
concerned the innovative process itself. 
Innovative process market failure (IPMF) occurs when the 
dynamic nature of the innovative process and its uncertain 
progression press investors toward more applied research 
than is socially desirable. IPMF has two defining 
characteristics: (1) dynamic dependence, i.e., future 
innovative progress depends on the existing state, and (2) 
prospective uncertainty, i.e., risks, time horizons, 
expenditures, and spillovers are uncertain as estimated ex 
ante. Limited public and private investment resources 
require a careful balance between applied and basic 
innovation projects over time to ensure efficient progress. 
62. See FRISCHMANN, supra note 46, at 37-40. 
63. Frischmann, supra note 3, at 374. 
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However, in the face of prospective uncertainty, investors 
skew innovation investment from the socially optimal 
distribution between applied and basic research, irrespective 
of public goods market failures .... 
The social costs of IPMF are an interesting brand of 
opportunity costs, rangmg from slowed technological 
development within an industry to significant 
macroeconomic effects on competitiveness in emerging 
industries. As commentators have noted, under-investment 
in basic research will likely undercut the supply of new ideas 
and, equally important, the supply of future avenues of 
research. Moreover, innovative process market failures 
interact with public goods market failures and the corrective 
institutional mechanisms employed by the government. 64 
Our reason for identifying system-independent failures is, among 
other things, to prevent conflation with system-dependent 
failures. Importantly, identification and analysis of the system-
independent obstacles will help frame the analysis of the 
provisioning system choice as well as the subsidiary comparative 
institutional analysis. 
We need to emphasize again here that identifying a particular 
failure or obstacle as system-independent does not imply that its 
significance or magnitude is entirely independent of institutional 
design. To the contrary, many system-independent failures can be 
mitigated or exacerbated by certain institutional design choices. 
The point is that doing comparative institutional analysis requires 
recognition that these failures will be relevant across different 
institutions, which should draw more attention to the ways 
institutional design can affect them. 
2. System-Dependent Failures. Markets, political systems, 
and communities serve as means. These systems comprise the 
rules of the game and structure the opportunities that people have 
to act in pursuit of their interests. The systems don't exist 
independently-they are socially constructed, whether designed or 
emergent. 65 They are provisioning systems-systems through 
64. Id. at 374-76. 
65. See BRE'IT FRISCHMANN & EVAN SELINGER, RE-ENGINEERING HUMANITY 45-50 
(2018) (discussing how systems depend on societies to construct their meaning). Consider 
antitrust law as an institution. Its primary (perhaps only) objective is maximizing 
[consumer welfare] [economic welfare] [social welfare]. To accomplish this objective, the 
institution is designed to achieve an intermediate objective, the preservation of [the 
competitive process] [competition] [the underlying operating system of the market]. In fact, 
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which we are provided with the outputs we desire. But for these 
systems to function as such, actors within the systems must also 
be able to figure out what to provide-to assess social demand. 
Markets determine how to match supply and demand through the 
price mechanism; political systems achieve this matching through 
elections and governance; communities through (generally more 
informal) social interactions. 
Market systems fail in certain ways, political systems in other 
ways, and non-governmental community systems in still others. 
Of course, there is overlap. But in terms of identifying the 
demanded outputs, the systems rely on different signals, 
information, processes, and so on. And in satisfying that demand, 
the systems rely on different actors, distribution methods, and 
relationships. We think comparative institutional analysis should 
account for characteristics that vary at the system level and shape 
both failures and institutions--characteristics such as demand-
signaling processes, evaluative criteria (for projects or 
investments or innovation), and basic capabilities operative within 
different settings or systems. Failures and institutions obviously 
do not correspond exactly, and we suspect that comparative 
analysis of these and other characteristics will provide guidance 
for continued analysis. Solid comparative analysis will require 
theory and empiricism in tandem rather than in isolation from 
each other. Comparative (failure and institutional) analysis is 
necessarily contextual. 
System failures-market failures, political system failures, 
and community system failures--occur within each system and 
are a product of the particular system. In essence, the failures 
derive from societal use of the system as a means. For example, 
markets as means depend on a particular architecture, basic 
operating system, set of operating procedures, and so on. Perhaps 
the most basic defining feature of the operating system of a market 
is reliance on the price mechanism. This reliance has 
consequences, and it causes certain failures, particularly as 
compared to alternative systems. Demand-side market failures 
can be understood as situations in which markets allocate 
resources, structure relationships, and shape activities based on 
consumers' willingness to pay. 66 Because willingness to pay is 
antitrust law is tied directly to the provisioning system itself. The "who decides" question 
at the macro-level is determined. Congress then specified the law in very generic terms, in 
effect delegating to courts the responsibility for working out the institutional details. This 
is another macro-level "who decides" determination. Within antitrust law, the comparative 
institutional analysis focuses on doctrinal rules, presumptions, burdens of proof, and so on. 
66. This includes allocating resources, structuring relationships, and shaping 
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sometimes not a good proxy for actual demand,67 the market 
system can underperform in achieving some specified objective 
relative to another system. In prior work, Frischmann discussed 
this in terms of social demand exceeding private demand, usually 
because of external effects from public and social goods that are 
not reflected in private willingness to pay, but this may be an 
incomplete description. As Demsetz implied by the Nirvana 
Fallacy, the analysis should be comparative; failure of one system 
should be described and evaluated relative to an alternative 
system. 
Just as we emphasized above that characterizing a certain 
failure or obstacle as system-independent does not mean that 
institutional design is irrelevant, we need to emphasize here that 
the consequences of system-dependent failures may frequently be 
felt outside of that system. To take one basic example, failures in 
the government's provisioning of basic infrastructure are likely to 
affect market-based systems for providing other goods or services. 
Thus, analysts focused on system-dependent failures need to be 
attentive to extra-system effects. 
IV. APPLICATIONS AND EXAMPLES 
In this Part, we discuss some examples that we would like to 
explore as this project develops. For the most part, we have focused 
on potential applications of our approach, in part by highlighting 
some contexts in which others have already done work that is 
consistent with what we have described. Here we try to fit these 
applications within the typology we developed above, and we 
highlight strengths of the existing work while identifying issues 
for future elaboration. 
A. Shortsightedness 
In previous work, we attempted to lay the groundwork for a 
broader understanding of the goals of intellectual property law in 
the United States, particularly by arguing that there is room for a 
normative commitment to intergenerational justice, which we 
referred to generically as "intergenerational progress."68 We 
suggested that intellectual property law as an institution was not 
as future-regarding as it could be, primarily because it relies so 
heavily on the market, and the market is systematically 
shortsighted. We regarded this as a missed opportunity because 
activities based on demand derived from consumers' willingness to pay-that is, upstream. 
67. For example, "willingness" to pay may reflect ability to pay. 
68. See Frischmann & McKenna, supra note 19, at 123-25. 
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the subject matter of intellectual property makes it particularly 
susceptible to the promotion of intergenerational progress. 
We began this project where that previous work left off, 
intending to focus on the ways we could promote intergenerational 
progress by altering some rules within the intellectual property 
system and by increasing our focus on other institutions that 
might be used to supplement intellectual property rules and 
partially offset their shortsightedness. To accomplish this, we first 
identified a particular problem-the failure of the intellectual 
property system to adequately provision goods and services with 
long-range or broader social value. We took for granted a 
normative commitment to intergenerational equity, or at least left 
a complete defense of that commitment to a later date. We then 
identified a cause of that failure, specifically the delegation to "the 
market" of decisions about what types of cultural, scientific, and 
intellectual progress we want. 69 We therefore argued that 
nonmarket institutions-including various government, 
nonprofit, and other social institutions-should supplement 
intellectual property rules in order to provide the kinds of goods 
and services we had in mind. 
We anticipated building on that work and engaging in a 
comparative analysis of institutions for solving the 
shortsightedness problem, and we still hope to carry out that 
project. However, as we considered how to structure such an 
analysis, we realized that we needed a broader framework within 
which to conceive of our work. We recognized that 
shortsightedness is neither caused by nor unique to, the market as 
an institution. It is rather a consequence of a number of human 
behavioral characteristics-hyperbolic discounting among them. 
These behavioral characteristics afflict decision-makers in a 
variety of institutional settings. They are system-independent 
obstacles, to use our previous terminology. Nevertheless, we think 
shortsightedness is exacerbated by the market, relative to other 
mechanisms. 
The challenge of a well-executed comparative institutional 
analysis relating to the problem of shortsightedness will be to 
define with greater particularity the kinds of outputs we want 
69. See id. at 124-25, 127-28. To be clear, we recognized that there is obviously some 
logic to such an approach, and we do not deny that IP systems optimally designed to 
facilitate markets would lead to progress and improve the welfare of future generations at 
least in some respects. Our argument was instead that progress need not, and indeed 
should not, be conceived of in linear, binary terms (more progress or less). Progress instead 
should be seen as contextual, in the sense that progress takes place within a particular 
information ecosystem, and the defining characteristics of that ecosystem shape the path 
along which we progress. 
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some provisioning system to provide, to evaluate who is in the best 
position to make particularized judgments about those outputs 
(and what signals they will use to decide), and to consider how 
other institutions can be structured to ameliorate the 
shortsightedness problem and the potential effects of such 
institutional arrangements on the market actors in the 
intellectual property context. Also, we think it will be important to 
be sensitive to context here, for the shortsightedness problem (and 
the problems attendant to its solution) will vary considerably by 
industry or setting. 
B. Neglected Diseases 
Terry Fisher and Talha Syed are working on a book that 
engages in a rigorous comparative analysis of failures and 
institutions in the neglected disease context. Though we have not 
obtained access to the full book (yet), some of the chapters are 
available online.70 The book builds from their published article, 
Global Justice in Healthcare: Developing Drugs for the Developing 
World. 71 
In that article, Fisher and Syed accomplished three things. 
First, they identified a social crisis: "Each year, roughly nine 
million people in the developing world die from infectious 
diseases." Second, they developed a rigorous analysis of the 
normative arguments in favor of a social and political commitment 
to overcoming the crisis. And finally, Fisher and Syed identified 
two "obstacles" to achieving this objective. 
First, the majority of the most effective drugs are covered by 
patents, and the patentees typically pursue pricing 
strategies designed to maximize their profits. Second, 
pharmaceutical firms concentrate their research and 
development ("R & D") resources on diseases prevalent in 
Europe, the United States, and Japan-areas from which 
they receive 90-95% of their revenues-and most of the 
diseases that afflict developing countries are uncommon in 
those regions. 72 
The first two accomplishments together are quite useful in 
developing a normative baseline for evaluation and articulation of 
a well-specified, politically-acceptable (though still contestable) 
70. See WILLIAM w. FISHER III & TALHA SYED, INFECTION: THE HEALTH CRISIS IN THE 
DEVELOPING WORLD AND WHAT WE SHOULD Do ABOUT IT 22-23, https://cyber.harvard.edu/ 
people/tfisher/Infection.htm [https://perma.cc/4ES8-P65X] (last visited Aug. 29, 2019). 
71. William W. Fisher & Talha Syed, Global Justice in Healthcare: Developing Drugs 
for the Developing World, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581 (2007). 
72. Id. at 583. 
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objective. With respect to the normative baseline, it still might be 
useful to engage in scenario analysis where different normative 
baselines serve to differentiate the scenarios. But they have 
identified an objective. 
The two obstacles are interesting in the sense that they are 
system-dependent and, to some degree, institution-dependent. 
That is, both "obstacles" really seem to be a function of having 
chosen the market as the macro-level provisioning system and 
further the choice of patents as the market-modifying institution 
to determine or drive progress. 
It is not clear whether the authors engage in a comparative 
analysis of institutional options. Rather, it appears that they 
examine different institutions almost independently, motivated in 
part by the fit between the institution and a perceived problem. In 
a sense, they explain the gains that society might achieve through 
the use of particular institutional arrangements or reforms. But it 
is not clear that this is done in a comparative fashion. 
We look forward to the publication of their book and the 
opportunity to further explore comparative research in this 
important context. 
C. Climate Change 
Climate change is one of the most pressing dilemmas society 
will face in our lifetime. There is widespread agreement that we 
will need to innovate to deal with some of the many consequences. 
Thus, we believe it is fair to say that there is a reasonably well-
specified and accepted political commitment to support R&D 
investments in this context. We might state the objectives as 
promoting the development and widespread deployment of (1) 
innovation to reduce GHG emissions; and (2) innovation to 
mitigate the economic and social effects of climate change. We 
might articulate others, and we might articulate more specific 
subsidiary objectives already encompassed by (1) and (2). 
Moreover, social and political commitments or normative 
objectives will depend substantially on the scale and community 
chosen. · 
A comparative analysis would need to address a wide range of 
failures and institutions. There are a host of system-independent 
obstacles to confront, including several that we mentioned in the 
previous Part: shortsightedness, the nonrivalrousness of various 
environmental and knowledge resources, externalities of various 
types, and innovative process failures. 
We suspect that the choice of provisioning system may not be 
resolvable; all available provisioning systems may need to be 
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harnessed in certain situations. That is, there are likely to be 
complementary roles for government prov1s1omng, market 
prov1s10ning, and community-based or commons-based 
provisioning of innovation that meets societal needs. It might not 
be terribly useful to do a comparative analysis at the macro-level 
because of the difficulty in choosing a provisioning system. But 
such a choice might be more easily made in more specific contexts 
with more concrete objectives in mind. 
Josh Sarnoff recently published an exemplary starting point 
for this kind of analysis. 73 Here is the abstract for his paper: 
Huge amounts of money will soon be spent by governments 
and private entities to develop technology to reduce the costs 
of climate change mitigation and adaptation, and to deploy 
new energy and transportation infrastructures. Incredibly, 
we still lack any good idea of the best means of providing 
massive amounts of government or private money so as to 
promote the most innovation and technology diffusion at the 
lowest cost. This Article seeks to support better analyses of, 
and decision making regarding, the choices of government 
innovation-funding mechanisms by discussing the limits of 
current analyses and providing a taxonomy of such 
measures. It also proposes future work to better analyze 
what we know about these choices and their relative 
effectiveness, and it discusses new measures to expand our 
knowledge base, which include: (1) better tracking of 
government innovation-funding inputs and outputs; (2) 
better documentation of and self-conscious decision making 
regarding funding choices; and (3) creating experiments that 
go beyond existing natural experiments. 
Sarnoff analyzes the comparative institutional analysis 
literature that focuses on innovation and concludes: 
[W]e do not know very much yet about important issues that 
should inform our decisions. We do not know: what 
government innovation choices have actually been made, 
their results, and their effectiveness across a number of 
dimensions; why we have made those choices; how those 
choices might compare to alternatives; what factors 
influence the comparative effectiveness of those choices; and 
the extent to which those factors are driven by particular 
cultural considerations that may be subject to 
manipulation. 74 
73. Joshua D. Sarnoff, Government Choices in Innovation Funding (with Reference to 
Climate Change), 62 EMORYL.J. 1087, 1087 (2013). 
74. Id. at 1106. 
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Sarnoff then makes three proposals, which he suggests 
"would help improve evaluations of such choices and consequently 
help government decision[-]making in the first stance."75 
These proposals are: (1) better tracking of government-
innovation expenditure decisions and their outcomes; (2) 
self-conscious and documented legislative and agency 
decision[-]making regarding expenditure form choices; and 
(3) controlled experiments that go beyond existing natural 
experiments. 76 
Sarnoff then develops a useful taxonomy of government 
institutions: "(a) subsidization; (b) procurement; (c) direct 
development; (d) constructed commons; and (e) product, process, 
and market regulation."77 
Even though he does not engage in the comparative analysis 
of failures and institutions in context, his proposals and taxonomy 
would be useful in framing such an analysis. 78 
In a series of reports, the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) has undertaken 
sophisticated analyses of the relationships between technological 
innovation and climate change. Some of these reports have 
adopted a comparative institutional approach. In one such report, 
the OECD examined, through a variety of metrics and models, the 
potential impacts that different policies might have on innovation. 
The OECD assumed that the policy instrument utilized would 
have a different effect on innovation depending on the type of 
renewable energy source. For example, feed-in tariffs might affect 
innovation in solar PV differently than it would affect wind 
energy.79 
In 2011, the OECD published an extensive report analyzing a 
variety of "policy levers" that would encourage innovation in the 
75. Id. at 1116. 
76. Id. at 1107-08. 
77. Id. at 1116. 
78. Compare Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 
Taxation, Innovation, and the Environment, at 13-16 (Oct. 13, 2010), https://read.oecd-
ilibrary.org/environment/taxation-innovation-and-the-environment_9789264087637-
en#pagel (a comparative analysis of failures and institutions in context), with Sarnoff, 
supra note 73, at 1116 (Sarnoff's three proposals to help improve evaluations of government 
choices to fund innovations and Sarnoff's taxonomy of government institutions grouped into 
five categories). 
79. Ovan Hascic et al., Recent Trends in Innovation in Climate Change Mitigation 
Technologies, in ENERGY AND CLIMATE POLICY: BENDING THE TECHNOLOGICAL TRAJECTORY 
17, 37 (2012), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/environment/energy-and-climate-policy_9789 
264174573-en#page7. 
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energy and environmental sector.80 The normative goal was clear, 
and the report engaged in a comparative analysis at the mesa-level 
of national policy instruments. 81 The report distilled potential 
policy instruments into five different "vectors"---different 
components of existing policy instruments that could be used to 
encourage innovation-and measured the correlation between 
each policy vector on innovation. The five vectors included 
stringency, predictability, flexibility, depth, and incidence. 
Stringency referred to the ambitiousness of the environmental 
policy target relative to the baseline emissions trajectory; 
predictability to the effect a policy had on investor uncertainty; 
flexibility to the extent to which the innovator was able to identify 
the best way to meet the objective; depth to the incentives to 
innovate throughout the range of potential objectives; and 
incidence to whether the policy targeted the externality directly or 
whether the point of incidence was a proxy for the pollutant.82 
Note that the vectors related obstacles to objectives, and the 
comparative analysis evaluated policy instruments in terms of 
innovation, which in turn was measured according to the number 
of patent applications in selected environmental technology 
categories across OECD countries.83 The report indicated that 
policy stringency was correlated with innovation and this 
correlation was statistically significant. 84 Additionally, the 
flexibility vector was important because the results of the study 
indicated that governments should give firms stronger incentives 
to look for optimal technological means. The authors concluded 
that monetary taxes and tradable permit systems scored well on 
most of the criteria. Nonetheless, the authors concluded that they 
could divine no hard and fast rules and that much comparative 
and contextual work remained to be done: "[A]ssessment of the 
effects of environmental policy on technological innovation 
requires a close analysis of both the characteristics of the 
80. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., INVENTION AND TRANSFER OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGIES 14 (2011), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/environment/inve 
ntion-and-transfer-of-environmental-technologies_9789264115620-en#page I. 
81. See id. Notably, the book also includes three sectoral studies of innovation in 
alternative fuel vehicles, solid waste management and recycling, and green (sustainable) 
chemistry. Id. at 13. 
82. Id. at 22. 
83. See id. at 27-32. While there may be some problems with the methodology-for 
example, some would criticize using patent counts as a measure of innovation--our point 
here is not to criticize or defend the book on those terms. 
84. See id. at 33-35. 
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environmental policy framework and the technology areas which 
it is likely to affect."85 
The OECD has continued to engage in comparative work, and 
it has emphasized a greater need for research linking policy 
regimes to target innovation that achieves a particular 
environmental outcome. 86 
Further work on the identification of the innovation impacts 
of alternative policies is required. This will necessarily 
involve modeling the links between policy regimes, 
knowledge stocks, capital investment and specific 
environmental outcomes (e.g., emissions) in a comprehensive 
manner. The development of commensurable indicators of 
policy regimes across a variety of emitting sources is perhaps 
the greatest challenge.s7 
Given the scale and scope of the climate change dilemma and 
the potential role that innovation can play in addressing some of 
the challenges facing society, the time is ripe for sustained 
comparative analysis of innovation failures and institutions. As we 
suggested in the Introduction, this is where we suspect the action 
will and should be. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Scholars engaged in comparative institutional analysis are 
poised to make significant contributions in the field of intellectual 
property, or more broadly, in information law and policy. This 
Article aims to help guide that analysis, so that the work of 
different scholars can be aggregated and learned from. 
We have argued that to do comparative analysis well, 
analysts need to articulate and defend their normative baselines. 
Comparison can proceed at different levels (micro, meso, and 
macro), but there is important value in staying closer to the 
ground. Comparative institutional analysis 1s necessarily 
contextual. 
We have also argued that comparative institutional analysis 
must be accompanied by comparative failure analysis, by which 
we mean rigorous and contextual comparative analysis of the ways 
different institutional responses tend to fail. Engaging in that 
analysis requires distinguishing between system-dependent and 
system-independent failures, even recognizing that institutional 
design can exacerbate or ameliorate these failures. 
85. Id. at 14. 
86. See id. at 15. 
87. Id. 
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